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INTRODUCTION 
Andrew Coan’s excellent book, Rationing the Constitution, sheds 
important new light on an important facet of Supreme Court decision-
making: judicial capacity.1 Professor Coan argues persuasively that 
courts’ capacity—and, in particular, the U.S. Supreme Court’s capacity—
plays an important role in shaping various constitutional doctrines.2 By 
“capacity,” Coan means the number of cases that courts can realistically 
decide while preserving the judiciary’s own professional commitments to 
careful deliberation and reasoned decision-making.3 Because judges 
realize that their resources are limited, they shape various constitutional 
doctrines to deter potential litigants, lest a flood of constitutional plaintiffs 
inundate them with more cases than they can responsibly handle.4 As Coan 
 
 ∗  Earl Dunlap Distinguished Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty, 
University of Nebraska College of Law. I thank Sydney Hayes for exceptional research 
assistance; Nathan Kuenzi and Meg Sternitzky for organizing a great symposium; Olivia 
Radics and the other editors of the Wisconsin Law Review for their excellent editorial 
assistance; and David Schwartz and Andy Coan for hosting this symposium about Andy’s 
fabulous book.  
 1.  See ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL 
CAPACITY SHAPES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING (2019). 
2.  Id. at 13. 
3.  Id. at 15. 
4.  Id. at 25. 
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explains, “[t]he model’s core prediction is that, above a certain threshold, 
and especially in combination, high stakes and high volume will strongly 
constrain the Court to employ some combination of strong deference and 
categorical rules.”5 
Coan’s attention to judicial capacity is a shift away from the 
academy’s historic attention to the related but distinct issue of judicial 
competence.6 Whereas “competence” encompasses judges’ expertise and 
skill, “capacity” is a matter of bandwidth. Coan explains that the two are 
closely linked. Judges might be capable of deciding a certain kind of case 
in theory, but if in practice they receive too many cases, their theoretical 
competence doesn’t get them very far. Capacity helps determine 
competence.7 
Coan is surely correct that capacity partially does shape competence. 
The same is true, however, of the political branches. The judiciary may 
have the much smaller budget,8 but it is not the only part of our 
government that faces resource constraints. Nor is the judicial branch’s 
competence uniquely suspect. 
This symposium contribution considers whether and how 
comparative capacity and competence issues should inform judicial 
decision making. Building on some of my earlier work, it contends that 
courts should consider both their own and the relevant political branch’s 
capacity and competence.9 Judicial capacity constraints will necessarily 
play a role here, but this inquiry should be comparative. None of this is to 
attack Coan’s perceptive account of judicial decision-making but, rather, 
to suggest that his insights raise related normative questions with which 
judges and scholars should grapple. 
I. THE CASE FOR COMPARATIVE COMPETENCE INQUIRIES 
Coan argues persuasively that capacity limits judicial competence.10 
Had judges infinite time and resources, they could carefully examine each 
 
5.  Id. at 24.  
 6.  The legal academy may have been surprisingly inattentive to these issues 
before Professor Coan’s important book, but constitutional litigators have long recognized 
them. Indeed, constitutional plaintiffs’ lawyers often try to persuade judges that vindicating 
their clients’ claims in a particular case would not open the litigation floodgates. In other 
words, they try to allay judges’ capacity concerns. 
 7.  See COAN, supra note 1, at 180–81 (noting that courts are not “free to spend 
unlimited time and energy considering every constitutional issue on a case-by-case basis”).  
 8.  See id. at 17. 
 9.  See generally Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and 
Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2068 
(2011) [hereinafter Berger, Administrative Law Norms]. 
 10.  See COAN, supra note 1, at 179–89. 
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case’s legal and factual complexities. Judicial time and resources, 
however, are limited and one reason to “doubt judicial competence.”11 
Though Coan’s account is mostly descriptive, it also includes a 
normative corollary. Judicial capacity not only shapes constitutional 
doctrine but should shape it. In “capacity-constrained domains,” Coan 
writes, courts “may simply lack the capacity to engage in significantly 
more robust review.”12 Thus, he continues, “[t]he judicial capacity model 
bolsters the case against the courts by identifying an additional and largely 
unappreciated reason to doubt judicial competence.”13 Judges and 
academics must account, then, for capacity’s effects on judicial 
competence. 
This all makes sense, but courts are not the only institution with 
sometimes compromised competence. It is certainly true that we should 
not assess judicial review without reference to problems of judicial 
capacity and competence, but we could make a similar point about other 
governmental institutions. The judiciary is not the only branch suffering 
from insufficient resources. To be sure, the federal judiciary’s budget pales 
next to legislative and executive budgets,14 and some parts of the federal 
government have an abundance of resources.15 But some don’t, and many 
state and local governments face severe budgetary constraints. Partially 
for this reason, public actors’ competence varies from case to case. 
Of course, as prominent judges and scholars have long recognized, 
the political branches’ competence often is superior to courts’. Justice 
Holmes’ famous dissent in Lochner v. New York16 contended that 
legislatures, rather than courts, should make social and economic policy.17 
Building on this idea, legal process thinkers, most famously Henry Hart 
and Albert Sack, asked which institution is best suited to making decisions 
in a particular sphere.18 These and later thinkers frequently sought to 
 
 11.  Id. at 181.  
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id.; see also id. at 189 (arguing that courts “should leave most decisions to 
other institutional actors”) (emphasis in original). 
 14.  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE JUDICIARY FISCAL YEAR 2019 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUMMARY i (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fy_2019_congressional_budget_summary_fi
nal_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G4M-NEHA] (noting the federal judiciary’s 2018 assumed 
appropriation of $7 billion). 
 15.  See Kimberly Amadeo, US Federal Budget Breakdown, THE BALANCE (June 
25, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-federal-budget-breakdown-3305789 
[https://perma.cc/JU24-XQPU] (explaining that the Department of Defense has a base 
budget of $636 billion).  
16.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
 17.  See id. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 18.  See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 3 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994) (“[I]nstitutionalized procedures and the constitutive arrangements 
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constrain courts on the theory that they lack the political and epistemic 
authority of the public actors they review.19 
However, while judicial deference on these grounds is often 
warranted, it can also go too far, because the political branches themselves 
can be manifestly incompetent. Sometimes, the government’s competence 
is compromised for capacity reasons. For instance, some administrative 
agencies lack the resources to fulfill their statutory mandates. A particular 
agency’s competence, then, turns in some measure on resource allocations, 
which might fluctuate over time, depending on a variety of political, 
economic, and other factors.20 
Other times, the political branches lack competence, because they 
resist making use of the resources they do have. For example, while 
Congress’ fact finding capacity is greater than courts’, it doesn’t always 
utilize that superior capacity.21 In such cases, Congressional competence 
may be diminished, because it lacks the political will to examine evidence 
carefully. 
The political branches’ capacity and competence, then, are not static. 
They can vary between and within departments and also over time. The 
question is what courts, which face their own capacity concerns, should 
make of this point. Courts’ competence will sometimes be superior to the 
political branches’. The problem is that comparative capacity and 
competence inquiries are themselves time consuming. As Coan would 
remind us, they tax capacity. As a normative matter, then, how should 
courts’ own capacity limitations shape their comparative institutional 
inquiries? 
Constitutional scholars have long wrestled with variants of this 
question. Constitutional law often boils down to the question of “who 
decides who decides.”22 As scholars like Neil Komesar and Adrian 
Vermeule have emphasized, this question necessarily implicates 
institutional choice—that is, examination of the different branches’ 
relative strengths and weaknesses.23 This is not to say that courts 
 
establishing and governing them are obviously more fundamental than the substantive 
arrangements in the structure of a society . . . .”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. 
Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2033 (1994) 
(summarizing the legal process school).  
 19.  See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 
1078–79 (2008). 
 20.  See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 77–80 (2002) (discussing appropriation process for agencies). 
 21.  See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-
Finding, 84 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (2009) (challenging the idea that legislatures are superior fact-
finders because of repeated failure to adequately utilize fact-finding capabilities). 
 22.  NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND 
DEMAND OF RIGHTS 162 (2001).  
 23.  See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) [hereinafter KOMESAR, 
2020:215 Comparative Capacity and Competence 219 
necessarily find institutional considerations decisive. Constitutional 
doctrine, indeed, encompasses a wide variety of inquiries and sometimes 
ignores institutional considerations, perhaps because, as Coan might 
suggest, courts lack the capacity to examine such issues thoroughly.24 Still, 
given that constitutional law essentially allocates decision-making 
authority to one institution or another, courts ideally should examine both 
their own capacity and competence and the political branches’.25 The 
inquiry should be comparative.26 
II. COMPETENCE, CAPACITY, AND DEFERENCE 
A. An Overview of Institutional Deference Determinations 
If we accept that courts should compare their own competence and 
capacity to the other branches’, the question is how to build such inquiries 
into judicial decision-making. One approach might be to build such 
deference into the doctrine itself. As Professor Coan explains, various 
constitutional doctrines in diverse areas such as commerce, spending, non-
delegation, and equal protection are deferential in many or all contexts.27 
To be sure, there are important exceptions within some of these doctrines, 
and there are other areas, such as substantive due process, in which the 
Court seems non-deferential, at least at times. Nevertheless, Coan makes 
a compelling case that many constitutional doctrines reflect courts’ own 
anxieties about their limited capacity. 
A different approach would not bake deference into the doctrine but 
entertain an analytically distinct deference determination based on an 
institutional analysis of the political branch at issue. Such an analysis 
would focus on the relevant branch’s political and epistemic authority in 
the given context and on the court’s own comparative authority.28 Of 
course, this analysis is complicated by the fact that it would often be 
layered atop the substantive constitutional analysis, such as the tiers of 
 
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES]; ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 1 (2006) (asking “What decision-
procedures should particular institutions, with their particular capacities, use to interpret 
this text?”).  
 24.  See COAN, supra note 1, at 178–81; Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: 
The Judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
657, 661–63 (1988) (discussing the difficulties of courts examining an increasingly 
complex government). 
 25.  See Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional 
Decision Making, 98 IOWA L. REV. 465, 499 (2013).  
 26.  Cf. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 23, at 3 (advocating for 
“comparative institutional analysis”). 
 27.  See COAN, supra note 1, at 57–136. 
 28.  See Horwitz, supra note 19, at 1078–79. 
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scrutiny.29 In other words, the institutional analysis would yield an 
approximate level of deference, which, in turn, would color (but not pre-
determine) the court’s substantive doctrinal analysis. 
Though this approach may sound novel, the Court already sometimes 
engages in a variation of it, applying constitutional doctrine with a more 
or less deferential gloss. Sometimes, for example, the Court concludes that 
an administrative agency accused of violating an individual’s rights 
deserves less deference, because it has not made use of its ostensible 
expertise. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,30 for instance, the plaintiffs 
challenged on equal protection and due process grounds a Civil Service 
Commission rule that barred resident aliens from employment in the 
federal competitive civil service.31 Though the case raised constitutional 
rather than administrative law claims, the Court nevertheless expressed 
concern that the agency did not fulfill its “obligation to perform its 
responsibilities with some degree of expertise, and to make known the 
reasons for its important decisions.”32 
The Court did not explain precisely how the institutional analysis 
affected the constitutional outcome, but the agency’s institutional 
limitations militated in favor of undeferential review.33 The Court, thus, 
struck down the rule. Significantly, the decision did not purport to alter 
equal protection or due process doctrine in other cases. The deference 
determination, then, was a separate step in the Court’s analysis, distinct 
from the relevant doctrinal tests and unique to the agency action in that 
case. 
To be sure, judges sometimes instead bake deference into a particular 
doctrinal test. The non-delegation doctrine, for example, is an especially 
deferential doctrine (at least for now).34 An analytically distinct deference 
determination, then, is not the Court’s only option in thinking about 
deference. However, a separate deference determination may be especially 
appropriate where the relevant institutional factors vary from case to 
case—that is, where the political branches’ political and epistemic 
authority are likely to change depending on the circumstances, such as in 
cases involving administrative agencies. 
Even outside the agency context, courts could calibrate the deference 
they extend based on how the political branch at issue has done its job. For 
example, courts defer inconsistently to congressional findings. The 
Court’s approach to congressional fact-finding in these cases is 
 
 29.  See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 9, at 2074.  
30.  426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
31.  Id. at 90.  
 32.  See id. 115.  
 33.  See id. at 99–100, 115–17.  
 34.  But see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (advocating for less deferential non-delegation doctrine). 
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haphazard,35 but ideally it ought to depend on the care with which congress 
has found the relevant facts. 
Though some scholars contend that courts either should or should not 
defer to congressional findings as a matter of course, a more careful 
approach would calibrate such deference based on how Congress has acted 
in a particular instance.36 Congress’s factual findings, on this theory, 
deserve deference only where Congress has actually made use of its 
resources to examine evidence carefully.37 Where Congress has simply 
asserted things it wishes to be true, there’s a good argument that it doesn’t 
deserve deference.38 
B. Comparative Competence Inquiries and Administrative Agencies 
This kind of comparative-competence inquiry may be especially 
useful in certain constitutional cases involving administrative agencies. 
Courts often ignore the possibility that they should review administrative 
policies differently than legislative ones, even though agencies differ from 
Congress in important ways.39  Agencies’ inherent advantage is their 
ostensible expertise, which usually surpasses legislatures’.40 Their 
inherent disadvantage is their democratic accountability. Though agencies 
in theory answer to the President,41 in practice, much agency action 
happens far outside the public eye and arguably lacks democratic 
legitimacy.42 
 
 35.  Compare Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001) 
(rejecting Congressional findings underlying Americans with Disabilities Act), with Nev. 
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (deferring to congressional 
findings in Family Medical Leave Act).  
36.  See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in 
Rights-Enforcing and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 919 (2013). 
 37.  See, e.g., id. at 906–26; Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the 
Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1170–71 (2001). 
 38.  See Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1175 
(2007) (“[O]ften [Congress members] are locked into positions by ideology or political 
pressure before the hearing ever begins. Then the hearing is a charade.”); John O. McGinnis 
& Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 96 (2008) 
(noting that sometimes members of Congress try to create a legislative record that puts 
“legislation in the most favorable light”). 
 39.  See Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: 
Beyond the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 765–66 (1997). 
 40.  See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
19 (1985) (explaining that agency expertise is one of the primary justifications for the 
administrative state).  
 41.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–
66 (1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive 
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such 
policy choices . . . .”).  
 42.  See, e.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 59 (2008); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of 
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Importantly, though, an agency’s epistemic and political authority 
can vary tremendously depending on the circumstances. If institutional 
characteristics matter, judicial deference should depend on the agency’s 
authority in a particular context. An agency’s political authority in a 
particular case might depend on a host of factors, including, inter alia, the 
specificity of legislative guidance, the amount of political oversight, and 
the transparency of agency action.43 Its epistemic authority could turn on 
its level of expertise, its time and resources to study a problem, and the 
thoroughness of its consideration.44 These inquiries, of course, are already 
very familiar to courts from administrative law cases.45 My proposal here 
is that these same factors help guide deference determinations in certain 
constitutional cases. 
Such a case-by-case approach recognizes that a one-size-fits-all 
doctrine fails to account for the great diversity of agencies and agency 
actions.46 A deferential or undeferential general doctrine based on 
agencies’ institutional features, then, risks applying generalizations about 
agency action to specific instances where they don’t make sense. A more 
nuanced approach would calibrate the deference due to the agency based 
on the relative competence of the agency in a given case. 
This kind of institutional analysis would be particularly useful in 
fleshing out the deference owed to agencies in individual rights cases, like 
Mow Sun Wong.47 The Supreme Court has been very inconsistent in how 
it approaches these questions of deference. Courts sometimes reflexively 
grant institutionally-based deference—but not always. In some cases, for 
example, the Court expresses concern that an agency—rather than a more 
politically accountable unit of government—is acting.48 Oftentimes, 
however, the Court seems oblivious to these factors.49 
 
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1675–84 (1975) (rejecting theory 
of administrative law that conceives of agency as “transmission belt” for implementing 
legislative preferences).  
 43.  See Berger, Administrative Law Norms, supra note 9, at 2059–67. 
 44.  See id. at 2067–70. 
 45.  See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 527–33 (2003); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 479, 483 (2010). 
 46.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236 (2001).  
 47.  My focus is cases in which administrative action allegedly violates the 
Constitution, not cases involving “ordinary” administrative law, such as claims that 
particular agency action is arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2016) . 
Relatedly, my theory would not apply in areas like the non-delegation doctrine, where the 
questions involve larger separation-of-powers issues and do not turn on the particulars of 
agency behavior (though they do turn on the details of Congress’s delegation).  
 48.  See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
 49.  See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214 (1944). 
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Even in cases that present similar questions, the Court is inconsistent. 
For example, two canonical affirmative action cases, Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke50 and Grutter v. Bollinger,51 approach 
these issues differently. In Bakke, Justice Powell’s famous opinion 
emphasized that the university (that is, an administrative agency), rather 
than the state legislature, had crafted a policy that arguably infringed on 
equal protection principles. “[I]solated segments of our vast governmental 
structures,” wrote Powell, “are not competent to make those decisions 
[about important policy questions], at least in the absence of legislative 
mandates and legislatively determined criteria.”52 A quarter-century later 
in Grutter, the Court seemed untroubled by the fact that an agency, the 
University of Michigan Law School, had designed the policy in question. 
Indeed, the Court in Grutter explicitly deferred to the university, even 
though California and Michigan had delegated similar authority to their 
universities.53 
The proposal here would help bring some order to this chaos. 
Specifically, it would ask courts to supplement a traditional doctrinal 
analysis (e.g., free speech, equal protection) with an institutional deference 
determination. To be sure, courts can apply such doctrine without any 
reference to the institutions at issue, but if institutional competence 
matters, such a narrowly doctrinal approach oversimplifies the problem of 
institutional choice. Individual rights doctrine, after all, usually does not 
account for who is acting within the government and therefore tends to 
treat elected legislatures, administrative agencies, and other public actors 
as, more or less, the same. But they are not the same. Administrative 
agencies differ from legislatures in important respects. Even within the 
administrative sphere, some agencies are more competent than others, and 
some agency designs better facilitate accountability and performance.54 
Thus, where the agency has acted with political authority, expertise, and 
procedural regularity, more deference is appropriate than where it has not. 
Phrased somewhat differently, concerns about judicial capacity and 
 
50.  438 U.S. 264, 306 (1978).  
51.  539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
 52.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306. 
 53.  See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a); MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; Berger, 
Administrative Law Norms, supra note 9, at 2031.  
 54.  See, e.g., Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and 
Political Control, 126 YALE L. J. 1002, 1009 (2017) (examining features of institutional 
design that help shape agency’s political responsiveness); Paul Sabatier, The Acquisition 
and Utilization of Technical Information by Administrative Agencies, 23 ADMIN SCI. Q. 
396, 411–13 (1978) (examining variables affecting administrative agencies’ acquisition 
and utilization of technical information); Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand 
Expertise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences, 50 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 1097, 1117–29 (2015) (using typology of expertise to highlight complex and 
multifaceted nature of agency expertise). 
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competence would militate more strongly for deference where the relevant 
political branch itself demonstrates genuine competence. 
Of course, under a comparative competence inquiry, courts often will 
compare unfavorably to the political branches, especially in their 
understanding of “the realities of administration, and the manner in which 
power, including and most especially political power, operates in 
context.”55 But while the judiciary may be at a disadvantage in many cases, 
the political branches do not always make use of their comparative 
advantages. As Professor Coan points out, political branch officials, 
bowing to political pressures, may ignore their expertise.56 While judges’ 
fact-finding capacities are limited, they do also have access to legislative 
and administrative records, as well as other forms of fact-finding, such as 
trial transcripts and amicus briefs.57 Moreover, in some cases, it may turn 
out that an administrative agency is acting in secrecy with minimal 
expertise or procedural regularity. Where agencies act unprofessionally, 
there’s a good argument that judicial deference is undeserved. 
III. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS AND COMPLICATIONS 
My basic contention so far is that courts should weigh their own 
capacity and competence against the relevant political branch’s, especially 
in individual rights challenges to administrative action. There are, of 
course, important counter-arguments and complications to consider. It is 
impossible to do justice to them all in a short symposium contribution. 
Nevertheless, a few are worth identifying briefly to flesh out my own 
theory and to highlight interesting questions that Professor Coan’s exciting 
project raises. 
A. Comparative Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Fallible 
Judges 
Coan’s argument raises serious questions about my proposal. As he 
puts it, because of judicial capacity limitations, courts “should leave most 
decisions to other institutional actors.”58 Coan’s argument draws some 
inspiration from Komesar’s and Vermeule’s concerns about the judiciary’s 
limitations.59 As Professor Vermeule contends, judges often lack the 
 
 55.  Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 
523 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also COAN, supra note 1, at 179–80 (discussing 
arguments for and against judicial deference).  
 56.  See COAN, supra note 1, at 180. 
 57.  See id.  
 58.  Id. at 189 (emphasis in original).  
 59.  See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 23, at 134–49 
(weighing shortcomings in adjudicative system and judicial competence against merits of 
judicial independence and characteristics of other institutions); VERMEULE, supra note 23, 
2020:215 Comparative Capacity and Competence 225 
information and resources to make sound institutional choices.60 Phrased 
somewhat differently, many scholars’ and judges’ infatuation with 
vigorous judicial review fails to account for limited judicial capacities.61 
This “single institutionalism,” as Professor Komesar puts it, asks courts to 
police the other branches without considering when courts are well suited 
for that role.62 
My proposal is sympathetic to these concerns, but ultimately I place 
the power to review agency performance in judges’ hands, because 
agencies’ own competence and capacity vary too much to merit a uniform 
level of deference. Quite simply, encouraging courts to assess the relative 
epistemic and political authority of an agency in each case can help courts 
make more informed deference determinations. My theory recognizes that 
the institutional considerations can vary widely from case to case, and it 
encourages judges to calibrate their deference accordingly. 
Admittedly, my theory offers little institutional analysis of courts 
themselves. The best judges will consider such factors and weigh the 
judiciary’s institutional strengths and weaknesses against those of the 
agency under review. Ideally, scholars would assist this endeavor by 
providing their own independent analyses, which could help judges 
recognize more accurately when courts’ institutional deficits militate for 
deference. But I must concede that judges will never perform these 
analyses perfectly, and some might not even perform them well. 
One way out of this difficulty would be to eschew case-by-case 
institutional analysis and adopt a super-deferential presumption that would 
only invalidate political branch actions that clearly violate the 
Constitution.63 There are serious arguments in favor of this super-
deference,64 but, even if one accepts them, it is not clear that they should 
apply to constitutional challenges to administrative action. After all, 
administrative agencies suffer not only from a systematic democratic 
deficit but also sometimes even from an epistemic deficit that calls into 
question their raison d’etre.  
 
at 153–82 (arguing that uncertainty and “bounded rationality” sharply limit judicial 
competence). 
 60.  See VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 158, 254–55 (noting that judges make 
“interpretive choices in the face of impoverished information” with “only limited capacity 
to generate the needed information”).  
 61.  See id. at 237–53 (critiquing numerous constitutional theories which fail to 
account properly for judges’ limitations). 
 62.  See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 23, at 5–6.  
 63.  See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 254–55.  
 64.  See, e.g., ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS 
NOT A COURT AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES 167–84 (2012); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING 
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6–32 (1999); VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 
254–55; James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 151 (1893). 
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Indeed, there are instances where even a capacity-diminished court 
will bring more care to a matter than a delinquent agency. In such 
instances, categorical deference to the government could ignore blatant 
incompetence. If we take comparative institutional analysis seriously, 
judicial capacity should militate for judicial deference only if those 
limitations render the judiciary less competent than the political actor in 
question. Admittedly, comparative competence is not easily quantifiable, 
and there may be cases where we quibble about which institution is, in 
fact, more competent. But in a given case, judicial deference is only an 
appropriate reaction to capacity concerns if the judiciary’s competence is 
inferior to the government’s. 
To be sure, judges won’t always accurately judge their own 
competence. Some judges might be inclined to overestimate their 
competence. Others, preferring to defer to the political branches, might 
consistently underestimate it. Given that the comparative analysis requires 
courts to measure their relative competence with some accuracy, the 
difficulty of that inquiry poses a potentially serious problem to my 
proposal. 
It is worth pointing out, though, that courts might misjudge their own 
competence in many cases anyway. To this extent, my proposal offers the 
benefit of focusing judges’ attention squarely on these institutional 
questions. As we have already seen, courts sometimes engage in a version 
of these inquiries already, albeit in an inconsistent and inchoate manner.65 
The proposal here would encourage courts to be more deliberate and 
systematic. Courts, in other words, already inject deference determinations 
into their decisions, so we should encourage them to calibrate that 
deference more accurately and articulate it more honestly. To that extent, 
though admittedly imperfect, my proposal would likely be a substantial 
improvement over the status quo. 
Furthermore, this comparative institutional analysis can help avert 
constitutional injustices resulting from governmental incompetence. 
Lethal injection is a helpful example here. In part because of limited 
resources, many departments of corrections have proven incapable of 
designing and implementing viable lethal injection protocols that do not 
create significant risks of excruciating pain. The parade of errors is long. 
These agencies have entrusted protocols to dyslexic doctors, who admitted 
to mixing the wrong amounts of the drugs;66 specified certain drugs in their 
written protocols, only to end up injecting different drugs in actual 
 
 65.  See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text. 
 66.  See Elizabeth Weil, The Needle and the Damage Done, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(Feb. 11, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/magazine/11injection.t.html 
[https://perma.cc/N6GK-TZVW] (describing the execution protocol single-handedly 
controlled by a dyslexic doctor who admitted to using inconsistent dosages for lethal 
injection). 
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execution procedures;67 and failed to employ trained personnel to set the 
IV catheter in the inmate’s veins (resulting in the drugs being delivered 
not to the veins, but to the surrounding tissues).68 These and other glaring 
mistakes have contributed to several visibly botched executions.69 Quite 
simply, some agencies are not competent to perform the tasks the states 
have assigned them, and their incompetence creates a significant risk of an 
excruciating execution in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, 
many states shroud their execution protocols in secrecy,70 a lack of 
transparency that partially undermines the agencies’ political 
accountability. 
The Supreme Court has typically extended great deference to states 
in cases challenging these procedures on Eighth Amendment grounds.71 
Under my theory, such reflexive deference is unwarranted, given many 
states’ manifest incompetence.72 Limited judicial capacity and 
competence do not alter this conclusion. Judges, of course, should be 
aware of their own limitations, but judges are perfectly capable of 
determining whether prison officials are designing and implementing 
lethal injection protocols competently. An inexpert judge can still 
recognize the problem when a prison guard injects Drug A instead of Drug 
B.73 
 
 67.  See Associated Press, Oklahoma Death Penalty: State Plans to Execute 
Inmates with Nitrogen Gas, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/mar/14/oklahoma-death-penalty-nitrogen-
gas-lethal-injection [https://perma.cc/4ED8-EVTU] (noting that during a 2015 execution, 
Oklahoma injected the wrong lethal drugs). 
 68.  See Ben Crair, Photos from a Botched Lethal Injection, NEW REPUBLIC (May 
29, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117898/lethal-injection-photos-angel-diazs-
botched-execution-florida [https://perma.cc/BB8W-9P7Z].  
 69.  Matt Ford, One Hour and 57 Minutes in Arizona, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 24, 
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/one-hour-and-fifty-seven-
minutes-in-arizona/374951/ [https://perma.cc/Y2XP-G8UU] (describing four visibly 
botched executions in 2014 including nearly two hour execution of Joseph Wood); Jeffrey 
E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton Lockett, THE ATLANTIC (June 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/06/execution-clayton-
lockett/392069/ [https://perma.cc/TZ5L-FRFR].  
 70.  See ROBIN KONRAD, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., BEHIND THE CURTAIN: 
SECRECY AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (2018), 
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/pdf/SecrecyReport-2.f1560295685.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V2L5-CU58]; Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth 
Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1388–92 (2014). 
 71.  See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1125 (2019); Glossip v. Gross, 
135 S. Ct. 2726, 2739–40 (2015); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008).  
 72.  See Eric Berger, Gross Error, 91 WASH. L. REV. 929, 944–94 (2016).  
 73.  See Matt Ford, An Oklahoma Execution Done Wrong, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 
8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/10/an-oklahoma-execution-
done-wrong/409762/ [https://perma.cc/B69E-FMGK] (noting that Oklahoma used the 
wrong drug to execute Charles Warner in January 2015).  
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More generally, most judges can recognize when an inexpert agency 
acts in secret without standard procedures, meaningful oversight, or 
political accountability. In such circumstances, the case for deference is 
weak. The occasional judge may get it wrong in the occasional case, but, 
if encouraged to study these factors, most will not. Courts’ own 
limitations, then, ought not dissuade them from carefully reviewing 
governmental actors for plain incompetence, especially when that 
incompetence has constitutional implications. 
Even considered solely as a matter of judicial capacity, the Court’s 
deference in the lethal-injection area is perplexing, because the potential 
for future cases is limited. Only twenty-nine states still have the death 
penalty, and, depending on how you count, only roughly half of those 
actually attempt to carry out executions.74 Whereas a less deferential 
Commerce Clause test could plausibly call into question the 
constitutionality of huge sections of the federal code,75 even were the 
Supreme Court to renounce its deference in lethal injection cases, we 
wouldn’t see a huge uptick in cases. It’s true that lethal injection cases are 
resource intensive (especially in the trial courts), because they require 
careful factual analyses. In the aggregate, though, these cases are but a 
drop in the judicial bucket; there just aren’t that many lethal injection 
protocols to challenge. 
Nevertheless, my proposed institutional analysis is necessarily 
imperfect. A scholar like Professor Vermeule would point out that some 
judges aren’t going to be very good at assessing agencies’ competence or, 
for that matter, their own.76 Judges, for a variety of reasons, are fallible.77 
These are serious concerns, but given the nature of our judicial system 
and the terrific variety of administrative action, there is no other way to 
gauge agency competence in a given case. Legislatures and academics can 
measure agency performance in various ways over the long haul and 
identify those found lacking.78 This information can be useful to a court in 
 
 74.  See States with and without the Death Penalty – 2020, DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state.  
 75.  See COAN, supra note 1, at 74–75.  
 76.  Vermeule, for his part, limits his discussion of judicial review to review of 
federal statutes, see VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 282–83, so it is possible he would 
entertain a less deferential review over the class of cases I focus on (individual rights 
challenges to state or federal administrative agency actions). Presumably, however, his 
concerns about judicial limitations would still deeply inform his approach.  
 77.  See id. at 257.  
 78.  See, e.g., Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional 
Choices about Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 63 (1995); Sean 
Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy Discretion, and 
Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 886 (2007); Xinsheng Liu et al., 
Bureaucratic Expertise, Overconfidence, and Policy Choice, 30 GOVERNANCE 705, 715–
18 (2017); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INAPPROPRIATE USE OF EXPERTS AND 
CONSULTANTS AT SELECTED CIVILIAN AGENCIES (July 17, 1991). 
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determining whether an agency deserves presumptive trust in particular 
litigation. But many administrative agencies are very large with many 
employees performing a wide variety of tasks in a vast bureaucracy, so a 
particular agency’s “trustworthiness grade,” while moderately helpful, 
cannot definitively resolve whether an agency’s behavior merits deference 
in a particular case. Moreover, it’s highly unlikely that outside actors 
(legislatures or academics) could provide meaningful insight to such 
granular questions within the relatively short timeframe of litigation.79 Nor 
are agencies themselves likely to provide a fair and impartial measure of 
their own competence, especially in the context of litigation to which they 
would be a party. 
This really just leaves the courts. Judges are imperfect, some more so 
than others. There are hundreds of federal judges possessing a relatively 
wide range of abilities, work ethics, ideologies, temperaments, and so on. 
But the variation in federal judges’ abilities is still likely substantially 
smaller than the variation of federal and state agency action. Most federal 
judges (and many state judges, too) have impressive academic and 
professional accomplishments and earnestly believe themselves to be 
committed to fairness, impartiality, and rigor. All Article III judges enjoy 
life tenure and salary protection, which presumably affords a certain 
degree of independence. The ideal federal judge is exceptionally smart, 
impartial, exacting, and rigorous. While most judges fall short of these 
ideals, a large number are still very smart and aspire to them. 
Significantly, judges also all share some expertise over procedural 
issues. They may know nothing about a particular agency’s subject matter, 
but they should be able to tell whether the agency has followed the right 
administrative procedures and acted with care. For these reasons, we can 
be reasonably confident that most judges under my proposal would ask the 
right questions about administrative competence and that many would use 
that information wisely to discern a rough level of deference. 
By contrast, the qualifications, motivations, professional norms, 
backgrounds, ambitions, institutional commitments, and goals of 
administrative officials vary tremendously across and within agencies. So 
do the types of administrative agencies (federal, state, and local) and the 
kinds of things each agency does. This variation helps explain why one-
size-fits-all judicial scrutiny—whether lax or strict—is inappropriate. The 
appropriateness of deference in each case will necessarily depend on the 
particulars, and only the judge handling a particular case is in the position 
to weigh those particulars. 
 
 79.  To be clear, academics likely can provide more helpful comparative 
institutional analysis when measuring the courts against legislatures, but that analysis 
would not provide much guidance in cases involving administrative agencies on which I 
focus.  
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To be sure, judges’ rough (albeit informed) sense of an agency’s 
competence in a specific case might offend the pure institutionalist’s 
desire for more finely tuned assessment or, alternatively, for extreme 
deference that would obviate the need for judicial assessment at all.80 If 
the judge asks the right questions, however, she will be improving the 
quality of judicial review and making more informed decisions about 
when deference is appropriate.81 A conscious, comparative institutional 
analysis performed by a judge, however imperfectly, should help improve 
the judiciary’s competence. It is, in short, better for courts to ask these 
questions than not. 
Admittedly, these improvements will only be marginal. A scholar like 
Vermeule (and possibly Coan himself) would cry foul, for my proposal 
asks judges to perform a crucial task without providing a mechanism for 
measuring judges’ own fallibility. In one sense, this critique is fair, insofar 
as I ask judges to perform an inquiry that some will perform inadequately. 
In another sense, however, I think this critique misses the mark, because 
it ignores the need to work within the institutional and procedural systems 
we already have. Even if a blanket deference were theoretically 
appropriate in cases where an administrative agency has allegedly 
infringed on individual rights—and I have already argued it is not—it is 
emphatically not the system we have. Nor do courts defer consistently 
elsewhere. To the contrary, American judicial review modulates its level 
of deference based on a host of contextual but inconsistent (and sometimes 
unstated) factors.82 
Were we starting from scratch, perhaps a different approach would 
be preferable. For better or worse, though, we are not starting from scratch, 
and judges are working within frameworks that have existed, more or less, 
for generations. My institutional analysis asks a lot—probably too much—
of judges, but it is also realistic, because judges can incorporate my 
proposal into pre-existing practices of judicial review. It is an incremental 
change, but, for that reason, it is actually feasible. It will not solve all our 
problems, and it may even create some new ones, but, on balance, it 
improves our system of judicial review. 
 
 80.  See VERMEULE, supra note 23, at 2–6 (“Interpreters situated in particular 
institutions make mistakes when implementing any first-best account.”).  
 81.  Cf. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 23, at 150 (arguing that 
judicial independence “should tell judges that they should employ the limited resources of 
the adjudicative process by substituting adjudicative decision-making for political 
decision-making . . . only when the balance of bias, competence, and scale favors that 
substitution”). 
 82.  See Berger, supra note 25, at 472–91. To be clear, my argument does not 
directly address the rich scholarship exploring the relative merits of judicial review writ 
large, though my focus on institutionally based deference does accept judicial review’s 
legitimacy.  
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On this view, institutional analysis should encompass not only 
comparative analysis but also the unpleasant concession that we often 
won’t do it that well. It is still better to do it imperfectly than not to do it 
at all. Blanket deference may be appealing, because it accounts for judicial 
fallibility, but it fails to recognize that judges, more often than not, will 
have sufficient information and competence to evaluate agency 
competence fairly. Blanket deference also fails to protect against genuine 
administrative abuses. Of course, ideally we would conduct a more 
thorough, accurate comparative institutional analysis, but our system lacks 
the capacity to do that every time an agency is hauled into court for an 
alleged individual rights violation.83 By my lights, an imperfect 
institutional analysis is preferable to no institutional analysis and infinitely 
more realistic than a perfect one.84 
Finally, it bears emphasis that the institutional analysis proposed here 
would often not result in deferential review. It therefore should not 
necessarily further tax judicial capacity, at least in the aggregate. In some 
instances, like the lethal injection example, the inquiry will likely uncover 
governmental incompetence and yield a less deferential result. But those 
results will not always incent more plaintiffs, because the class of plaintiffs 
(death row inmates) will file cases anyway. And, significantly, in many 
other contexts, the court should conclude that the agency at issue has 
institutional competence superior to the judiciary’s and that deference is 
therefore appropriate. The approach here, then, will not produce 
consistently deferential results and therefore ought not invite substantially 
more litigation. 
B. Other Complications 
1. INTRA-JUDICIAL CAPACITY AND COMPETENCE 
While my focus has been inter-branch competence and capacity, 
intra-branch capacity can matter, too. Within the federal judiciary, for 
instance, different courts may have different capacities.85 Coan focuses 
primarily on the Supreme Court, which has the most visible docket.86 The 
 
 83.  Scholars like Vermuele and Komesar are entirely correct that many 
important constitutional questions never reach the courts and that the judiciary’s role in 
shaping our constitutional order is therefore often overstated. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra 
note 23, at 269. But judicial review nevertheless matters—quite obviously in the 
constitutional cases the Court does decide, but also in creating a constitutional baseline of 
which the political branches take frequent notice.  
 84.  See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 23, at 5 (“Institutional 
choice is difficult as well as essential. The choice is always among highly imperfect 
alternatives.”). 
 85.  See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 86.  See COAN, supra note 1, at 19.  
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Court’s docket obviously matters tremendously, probably especially in the 
field of constitutional law. But the Supreme Court’s capacity differs from 
the lower federal courts’ in important ways. Most notably, the certiorari 
process allows the Court to control its own caseload.87 Even were the 
Court to issue decisions unleashing a torrent of litigation, it could insulate 
itself from future cases simply by denying review. This isn’t hard to do; 
over the past few decades, the Court has reduced its annual merits cases 
by about half.88 
Of course, as Coan points out, the Court feels some pressure to 
maintain uniformity of federal law.89 Uniformity, however, is only one of 
several values to which the Court must attend,90 so that pressure does not 
necessarily translate into a much larger caseload. The Court, in fact, often 
lets circuit splits percolate and reviews only 0.11% of circuit court 
decisions.91 Admittedly, the Court likely hears a somewhat higher 
percentage of constitutional decisions, but, even so, the Court takes very 
few cases a year. 
Moreover, even when the Court wishes to resolve a matter, it often 
can do so by deciding a case or two, and then letting the lower courts apply 
those precedents. Sometimes, discrepancies arise, but the Court does not 
always feel obligated to resolve them.92 By contrast, it is the lower federal 
courts that for years have suffered from “a crisis of volume.”93 
To this extent, lower courts usually bear the brunt of the Court’s 
rulings. Of course, Supreme Court justices still may internalize capacity 
concerns and consider the capacity of the judiciary writ large. However, at 
the end of the day, the Justices do not shoulder the burdens of the caseload 
they help create. 
 
 87.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2020); 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2020).  
 88.  See Supreme Court of the United States Petitions Granted, 1970-2015, FED. 
JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/supreme-court-
caseloads-1880-2015 [https://perma.cc/3DQM-V4HS] (documenting sharp decrease in 
number of certiorari petitions granted annually from approximately 170 a year in the 1970s 
and 1980s to roughly eighty per year in the 2010s).  
89.  See COAN, supra note 1, at 19. 
 90.  See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 502 (7th ed. 2015). 
 91.  See Ryan W. Copus, Statistical Precedent: Allocating Judicial Attention 4 
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3459840; Doni Gewirtzman, Lower 
Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive System, 61 AM. 
U. L. REV. 457, 481–96 (2012) (discussing the Supreme Courts practice of allowing issues 
to percolate in the lower courts and the benefits and risks accompanying that approach). 
 92.  See Gewirtzman, supra note 91, at 474–77 (discussing the growing 
“discretionary space” in constitutional law). 
 93.  See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (1990), 
available at https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/RepFCSC.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9T57-5VET]; WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, 
INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS IN CRISIS 3–4 (2013).  
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The relative capacity of different courts complicates my proposed 
comparative-competence inquiry. The capacities (and the competence) of 
courts vary. One application of my theory might ask each court to consider 
its own particular capacity limitations in weighing the judiciary’s 
competence against the political branch’s. Such an approach would be 
untenable. Neither the law of deference (to the extent there is such a thing) 
nor the law generally should vary based on the congestion of a particular 
court’s docket or each individual judge’s familiarity with a particular area 
of law. In practice, perhaps these factors silently do shape judicial 
decisions, but the uniformity of federal law would be seriously 
compromised should judges formally incorporate such considerations into 
the law. In other words, while variations between agencies should affect 
judicial deference, the variations between different judges should not. 
Still, Coan’s insights might inspire future work examining whether lower 
court deference, as an empirical matter, turns partially on issues like 
docket size, particular judges’ substantive expertise, and other capacity 
and competence issues. 
2. CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF JUDICIAL CAPACITY AND THE 
RATIONING OF JUSTICE 
Courts are not the only public institutions with something to say about 
judicial capacity. Specifically, Congress sometimes stipulates deferential 
review, in part to preserve judicial resources. These interventions shed 
normative light on the dangers of letting capacity concerns play too 
dominant a role in the law and access to justice. 
The best example involves prison litigation. About 2.2 million people 
are in state and federal prisons annually.94 These inmates file many civil 
rights and habeas claims,95  some meritorious and some bogus. On the civil 
rights side, some prisoners live in appalling conditions, which raise 
genuine Eighth Amendment issues. Others may have minor grievances 
and have nothing to lose by suing. On the habeas side, some inmates can 
point to serious constitutional violations underlying their convictions and 
even evidence of actual innocence.96 Others have legally and factually 
weak habeas claims but bring them anyway. Once again, they have little 
to lose. 
 
 94.  See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION 
– AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 2 (2017).  
 95.  Civil rights prisoner actions challenge the way in which the inmate’s 
sentence is carried out, such as the prison conditions. Habeas petitions challenge the 
legitimacy of the inmate’s sentence or the fact of conviction. See Heck v. Humphrey, 521 
U.S. 477, 481 (1994).  
 96.  See BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 179 (2012).  
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Responding to the high volume of prison cases, Congress in 1996 
passed both the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).97 Both statutes made it 
substantially harder for prisoners to bring successful court actions, 
whether through habeas petitions (AEDPA) or civil rights suits (PLRA).98 
AEDPA made several changes that collectively required greater federal 
court deference to state court criminal proceedings.99 It also imposed a 
new “gatekeeping” provision, preventing inmates from filing “second or 
successive” habeas petitions except in narrow circumstances, even if a 
particular claim was not ripe at the time the inmate filed his initial habeas 
petition.100 For its part, the PLRA also restricted inmates’ access to federal 
courts by imposing on inmates new exhaustion requirements, filing fees, 
and other procedural hurdles.101 
Judicial capacity was a motivating factor behind both statutes. In 
1995, inmates filed 40,000 new federal civil lawsuits, amounting to 19% 
of the federal civil docket.102 About 15% of federal civil trials that year 
were for inmate civil rights cases.103 There were not as many federal 
habeas petitions, but in the half decade prior to AEDPA, inmates still filed 
a sizable number—about 12,800 per year.104 In light of these statistics, 
Congress wanted to make it harder for prison inmates to bring cases, in 
part because it perceived that such litigation was consuming substantial 
judicial resources.105 
It is no accident that Congress chose to protect judicial capacity in the 
area of prisoner litigation. Prisoners are an especially unpopular class, so 
it was politically safe to restrict their access to courts. Congress also may 
 
 97.  See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1996).  
 98.  See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1559 
(2003) (arguing that the PLRA “drastically altered the corrections litigation environment” 
by making it much harder in various ways for inmates to bring meritorious civil rights 
claims).  
 99.  See, e.g., RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2.4[d][xi], at 81 (2018).  
 100.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2020).  
 101.  See Schlanger, supra note 98, at 1559, 1627–33.  
 102.  See id. at 1558.  
 103.  See id.  
 104.  This number includes both capital and non-capital habeas petitions. See 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF: BACKGROUND, LEGISLATION, AND ISSUES (2007), 
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33259.html#ifn25 [https://perma.cc/G2QE-
PV35].  
 105.  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 111 (1996) (noting 
that AEDPA attempts to “curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to 
address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital systems”); Kermit 
Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequences of 
Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1772 (2003) (explaining that Congress passed 
PLRA in part to deal with high volume of prison civil rights suits, including some 
notoriously frivolous cases).  
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have wanted to signal that it was tough on crime, a response to the period’s 
high crime rates.106 And Congress, no doubt, believed that much prisoner 
litigation was frivolous. But part of Congress’s motivation was that, 
frivolous or meritorious, there was simply too much prisoner litigation.107 
It was a capacity issue. 
The scholarly consensus is that these statutes go too far.108 In seeking 
to reduce habeas and civil rights actions, AEDPA and the PLRA cut off 
access to justice for many inmates with legitimate grievances.109 Congress 
may have been correct that prison litigation (some of it frivolous) 
overwhelmed the federal courts, but it over-corrected.110 
This example has implications for both Professor Coan’s argument 
and my own. For Coan, it suggests that Congress, notwithstanding the 
Court’s deferential doctrines, thinks the judiciary sometimes needs 
assistance managing its own limited capacity. Even frivolous cases take 
time to resolve, so deferential doctrines and bright-line rules only relieve 
docket congestion so much, especially when the incentive to file cases is 
high, regardless of the legal rule.   
Interestingly, the Court also may recognize that it can encourage 
Congress to lighten the judiciary’s load. Chief Justice Rehnquist, after all, 
formed the Powell Committee in 1988 to study “the necessity and 
desirability of legislation directed towards avoiding delay and the lack of 
finality in capital cases.”111 Congress ultimately adopted some of the 
 
 106.  Crime rates actually peaked in 1991 and by 1996 had already begun what 
would become a dramatic decline. See PFAFF, supra note 94, at 3. Nevertheless, crime rates 
in 1996 were still near all-time highs.  
 107.  See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (“Beyond doubt, 
Congress enacted [the PLRA] to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner 
suits.”).  
 108.  See, e.g., James S. Liebman, An “Effective Death Penalty”?: AEDPA and 
Error Detection in Capital Cases, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 427 (2001) (“AEDPA’s reforms 
have made the system substantially less safe and reliable.”); Roosevelt, supra note 105, at 
1772 (summarizing academic commentary about PLRA).  
 109.  See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 108, at 427; Margo Schlanger & Giovanna 
Shay, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: The Case for Amending 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 139, 140 (2008) (“The PLRA’s 
obstacles to meritorious lawsuits are undermining the rule of law in our prisons and jails, 
granting the government near-impunity to violate the rights of prisoners without fear of 
consequences.”).  
 110.  See generally Schlanger, supra note 98, at 1575–78 (examining trends in 
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Powell Committee’s recommendations in AEDPA,112 thus demonstrating 
that the judiciary and Congress can collaborate when they believe that 
judicial capacity problems are interfering with other societal goals. 
Of course, capacity concerns were not Congress’s sole motivation. 
Congressional actions were limited to the area of prison litigation, so 
perhaps lessons from these statutes are not generalizable. Indeed, given 
Coan’s study, the conclusion might be that the Court appropriately 
manages its own limited capacity most of the time, and that Congress only 
intervenes in unusual circumstances when an especially unpopular group 
of plaintiffs files an especially high number of cases, many of them 
frivolous.  Still, one lesson from these statutes is that Congress has the 
authority to reshape judicial dockets substantially. 
These statutes also complicate my proposal that courts consider not 
only their own competence limitations but also the political branches’. 
When Congress heightens the bar for, say, prison-conditions cases, courts 
have fewer opportunities to examine whether a particular prison’s 
expertise and behavior merit deference. To this extent, the PLRA makes it 
substantially harder for litigants to uncover unprofessional and 
unconstitutional governmental behavior. In other words, it makes it more 
difficult to put my theory into practice.   
To the extent many commentators agree that AEDPA and the PLRA 
go too far in limiting access to justice for prison inmates,113 this story 
raises the normative question of whether judicial capacity should be such 
a dominant value. Some prison conditions in this country are horrific, 
threatening the health and even the lives of tens of thousands of people.114 
 
 112.  See, e.g., Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance 
of Postconviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital 
Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31, 49.  
 113.  See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, 
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REV. 1219, 1220 (2015). 
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9b8fba003e81_story.html (describing dangerous prison conditions including exposure to 
extreme cold, punishment of mentally ill inmates, and prolonged stays in solitary 
confinement); Katie Benner & Shaila Dewan, Alabama’s Gruesome Prisons: Report Finds 
Rape and Murder at All Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019), 
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The PLRA makes it harder for these people to protect their rights and lives 
in court. Similarly, many innocent people are in prison,115 and AEDPA 
makes it harder for them to establish their innocence. 
Professor Coan’s book makes a compelling case that courts can and 
should factor judicial capacity into their decisions. I agree but also caution 
that there are other important values in play. We must recognize the 
importance of judicial capacity in shaping doctrine and limiting judicial 
competence, but, as a normative matter, such concerns ought not justify 
abdication of judicial responsibility.116 The public is starting to pay 
attention to our criminal justice system’s deep flaws, so perhaps serious 
legislative reforms may soon be feasible. For decades, however, litigation 
provided prison inmates the primary protection against horrific conditions 
and grave injustice. It was courts or nothing. 
Access to justice is an especially acute concern in the prison context, 
given that inmates are politically powerless. But access to justice issues 
arise in other contexts as well, and individuals, particularly members of 
various minority groups, sometimes must turn to courts to protect 
themselves from grave injustices. A core judicial function is to protect 
unpopular minorities from tyrannical majorities.117 We should pay 
attention to judicial capacity, but we should not forget these other norms. 
As Learned Hand put it, “thou shalt not ration justice.”118 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Coan’s superb book persuasively argues that judicial 
capacity plays a significant role in shaping constitutional doctrine. He 
further suggests that because judicial capacity limits judicial competence, 
judges should tailor their review accordingly. My modest and (I believe) 
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friendly amendment is to suggest that before limiting the scope of judicial 
review in particular contexts, we also consider the relative capacities and 
competencies of the political branches, particularly in cases involving 
administrative agencies. Capacity, as Coan contends, does partially 
determine judicial competence, so it clearly matters, both descriptively 
and normatively. However, the political branches’ capacity and 
competence are also limited. When they are more limited than courts’, 
judicial deference is inappropriate. Competence, in short, should be a 
comparative inquiry. Judicial capacity is an important part of that inquiry, 
but it is only a part of it. 
